Friday, 11 September 2009

Knasas' critique of Lonergan, again

Some points in connection with the Knasas question:

Distinguish (1) apprehension under the formality of the true and of being, from (2) apprehension under the formality of the intelligible, and from (3) apprehension under the formality of the experienced. So it is always being that is attained, but under different formalities.

Again, even if, with De Smet and the Marechalians, we were to agree that judgment comes first, we would still have to distinguish what type of being it is that is attained: is it merely mathematical being, or merely possible being, or is it being that is 'independently existent' of the knower?

Study better this distinction of different 'spheres' of being in "Metaphysics as Horizon."

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