Balthasar's rejection of the psychological analogy

From Neil Ormerod I learnt something new this morning:

Hans Urs von Balthasar has been particular scathing of the approach of the psychological analogy. [18] According to Hunt, Balthasar “eschews a consideration of human consciousness as primary analogy for the Trinity of divine persons, and is deeply suspicious of any kind of turn tothe subject”.  Balthasar rejects any analogy based on “the human mind and its acts of intellect and will” since “both processions must be understood as processions of love”. [19] For Balthasar, “only love is credible”.  In its place Balthasar seeks to find analogies for the Trinity in the paschal mystery, in the death, descent into hell and resurrection of the Son. [N. Ormerod, "The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity: At Odds with Modernity," Pacifica 14 (Oct 2001) 286-87. See http://lonergan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/09005-Ormerod-Trinity-Analogy.pdf as of 2 Oct 2012.]

Perhaps Ratzinger's remarks on the person need to be understood also in the light of Balthasar's rejection fo the psychological analogy.

Radical Orthodoxy and Balthasar

It would seem that Radical Orthodoxy is not averse to Balthasar. Several of the essays (see Loughlin and Bauerschmidt) in Radical Orthodoxy quote him, if not actually study him, with approval, though there is also the occasional disagreement and 'correction' of perspective.

Theological trivia

Rahner, Lonergan, Congar: all born in 1904. Rahner and Lonergan both died in 1984. Balthasar was born in 1905, and died in 1988. Congar died in 1995.

Balthasar and Heidegger

Balthasar seems to be influenced by Heidegger. Rahner clearly is. Both are influenced by de Lubac. But their tendencies are opposed. How? What? Why? 

It would seem that Balthasar both welcomes and unwelcome Heidegger. See: “O’Regan delivered a magnificent analysis of the complex relationship between Balthasar and Heidegger, citing both a ‘welcoming’ and an ‘unwelcoming’ of the latter in Balthasar’s theology. It was the unwelcoming which O’Regan was especially interested in, citing evocatively Balthasar’s conception of a ‘gigantic misremembering’ on Heidegger’s part which distorted the relationship between Heidegger and Christian thought.” Jones Irwin, “A Contemporary Platonic-Christianity? – On Radical Orthodoxy.” http://www.mic.ul.ie/stephen/vol12/Review.htm as of 2 August 2010.

See Rossi, Osvaldo. “Herrlichkeit e Sein: Heidegger nel pensiero di Hans Urs von Balthasar.” Communio: Rivista Internazionale di Teologia e Cultura 147 (1996) 94-105. [STS R F-35. 1996 (1).]

Nichols' From Newman to Congar

Aidan Nichols' book, From Newman to Congar (1990), is a real find. I came to it through the Conclusion that I found on the net: eminently readable, and provocative, speaking about the stasis on doctrinal development reached both in the thoughts of Rahner, Schillebeeckx and Congar and in the Council, and then about the coming apart of this stasis or synthesis in all three major theologians in the post-conciliar period, summarized in the three notions of pluralism (Rahner), hermeneutics (Schillebeeckx), and reception (Congar).

The lovely thing was to find Nichols' book in our library. I am reading this just now. Nichols is very readable, and Englishly lucid. So I don't struggle. But: his Conclusion really sets the case, and opens up the can of worms. But it is disappointing, because it says nothing more. Does he say this in the next promised book, which also, providentially, I happened to find in our library - The Shape of Catholic Theology? To be seen. At any rate, I think the problem is being set.

Where would Lonergan fit in, in all this? Nichols has a brief something to say on Lonergan, who he couples with Tracy; but I think his treatment is far from complete or satisfactory.

How does Lonergan hold up against pluralism, hermeneutics and reception? That is the interesting question.

Anyway, one thing is becoming clear, also from Nichols himself: the key issue regards propositional truth (From Newman 16). Nichols says there is no Catholic Christianity without this. Surprising, because Guy Mansini ("The Abiding Theological Significance of Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel," The Thomist 73/4 [2009] 593-620) seems to be saying that de Lubac and Balthasar are involved in a Platonizing of theology... and Nichols is a Balthasar scholar.

But: checking out Mansini in a blog entry below, I found this: the distinction between Lonergan and the Communio theologians (de Lubac and Balthasar included) is that the latter want to abandon the scientific character of theology.

Blondel, Balthasar...

The other day Abp. Felix Machado said that Balthasar was a powerful name these days; almost all the big positions in the Vatican were being held by Balthasar people, and to study Balthasar, to be an expert in Balthasar, is to have a shortcut to the Vatican.

John Misquitta, SJ, said that Balthasar seems to be used as a stick to beat Rahner with; there has been, over the last few years, a concerted effort to discredit Rahner.

In fact, Balthasar is a big name even at the Gregorian these days; Rahner is hardly spoken of.

Of course, I think the names of Balthasar and Ratzinger were never even uttered in our theology days here in India... For some reason, these two names are not beloved on the Indian subcontinent, unless things are changing now.

But there was / is also a Blondel influence on the Gregorian. In my time there (1990-94) there used to be Peter Henrici, world-renowned Blondel scholar, as well as Xavier Tilliette, who is also in his own right a Blondel scholar, besides some others too. Henrici is a nephew of Balthasar's from his mother's side, and I think I remember him saying that Balthasar was influenced by Blondel.

So Blondel, Marechal, Balthasar, and so on: would be interesting to study those connections.

Bob Doran is of course trying to bring Lonergan and Balthasar people together; he himself and some of his students seem to be writing stuff on Balthasar. Fred Lawrence does not seem to be that keen on this particular connection. I think he feels Balthasar remains somehow too much locked up in the metaphorical, the figurative, the descriptive.