Sunday, 5 May 2024

Derrida on forgiveness

A series of questions raised by Jacques Derrida in his book, Lo spergiuro e il perdono (Jaca Book, a cura di Vittorio Perego) (EN: Perjury and Pardon, 2 vols. Un. of Chicago Press, 2022) (FR: Le parjure e le pardon, 2 vol. Seuil, 2019)

Cosa significa davvero perdonare; se il perdono sia relato e commisurato o meno alla colpa da perdonarsi; se debba essere concesso a certe condizioni oppure sia, di sua natura, incondizionato; se modifichi il passato oppure soltanto il futuro di chi lo chiede come di chi lo "offre"; se sia lecito, e fino a che punto, rifiutare il perdono; e se sia altrettanto lecito proiettare sugli affari umani una logica perdonista in fondo divina, che il mondo occidentale ha ereditato dalla Bibbia e che la saggezza greca ignorava (sebbe in queste pagine Derrida metta in discussione anche tale assunto). (Massimo Giuliani, "Derrida e i monoteismi alle prese col perdono," [review of Derrida's book] Avvenire, venerdì, 15 marzo 2024, Agora p. III)

En (DeepL):

What it really means to forgive; whether or not forgiveness is relative and commensurate with the guilt to be forgiven; whether it must be granted under certain conditions or is, by its very nature, unconditional; whether it changes the past or only the future of those who ask for it as well as those who 'offer it'; whether it is permissible, and to what extent, to refuse forgiveness; and whether it is equally permissible to project onto human affairs a basically divine logic of forgiveness, which the Western world inherited from the Bible and which Greek wisdom ignored (even if Derrida also questions this assumption in these pages).

The author of the review declares that Christianity does not have a monopoly on pardon, and that it is a prejudice that Christianity is a religion of pardon, and Judaism no. 

[My spontaneous reaction: it is certainly much easier to raise the topic of forgiveness in Christianity, seeing that it is so central to the teaching and example of Jesus, than in other religions...]


Monday, 11 March 2024

Malkovsky on the Personhood of Sankara's para brahman

Sankara's possibile antecedents: Patanjala yoga (Hacker); bhedabheda(Hajime Nakamura), perhaps under the influence of the Gaudapadiya-karika (Ingalls). Vaisnavism (Hacker; Nakamura; W.G. Neevel; Jacqueline Hirst; Malkovsky; Sengaku Mayeda). (542-544)

The distinction between a higher and lower brahman is central of Sankara. (545)

The majority of scholars - both nondualists and theists - believe that his para brahman is impersonal. The implication is that the God of the theists - whether Hindu or not - is an inferior deity. The bhaktas could never accept this. Georges Thibaut much preferred Ramanuja's conception. (546)

A small group regards the para brahman as personal - concluding either from philosophical considerations of 'person' (chiefly De Smet) or from exegesis (chiefly Hacker). (547)

Of course, Sankara does not - could not - take up the question of brahman's personhood. (547)

Hacker holds that Sankara is an illusionist, but also shows that most often S identifies isvara with para brahman. (553-555) A proper understanding of the Absolute need not exclude its being personal. (555)

D.M. Datta: one of the strongest affirmations of realism in Sankara. (555) See also Saccidanandendra Sarasvati as cited by Karl Potter. (556n51)

Julius Lipner: The Advaitic absolute is trans-personal rather than impersonal. (561)

De Smet on the Trinity: see "Light from the Christian Jnana-Karma-Bhakti-Samuccaya" in Religious Consciousness and Life-Worlds, ed. T.S. Rukmani (New Delhi: Indus Publ. Co., 1988) 81. (561n75)

Mahadevan. (562)