Purely natural religion

To be added in a consideration of Lonergan's early thinking on religion:

Natural Desire to See God, 1C 88: is a state of pure nature, a world order in which no one receives grace, a concrete possibility? Lonergan talks about a religion that is natural. At 1C 90, he says that a world order without grace is a concrete possibility; but that this is not a central doctrine but only a marginal theorem. Renaissance theologians magnified this marginal theorem in Aquinas into a central doctrine: the state of pure nature.

The natural and the supernatural in the religions

Joaquim’s paper Jacques Maritain e la mistica natural Indiana,” a reworked version of the article we printed in DJPE, makes very clear the position of Maritain: Christian mysticism is supernatural; Indian mysticism is really an experience of the self, and purely natural. However, he does admit that there could be ‘mixtures’ – mystical experiences that have ‘touches’ of the supernatural. How, I have to read further to understand.
I was asking myself: how does this position compare with that of Lonergan? Perhaps this way. In his earlier writings, Lonergan would talk of natural, relatively supernatural and absolutely supernatural solutions to the problem of evil. In his later position, he would take the clear (Christian) stand that the actually realized dispensation is absolutely supernatural. He would go further and state that the absolutely supernatural gift of God’s love is given to all, and therefore is available / given in all religions. He would say clearly that, in their positive moments, all religions are fruits of the gift of the Spirit.
I am thinking now that even in his earlier position, on the hypothesis / faith assertion that the actually realized dispensation is the absolutely supernatural one, he might have envisaged such a position. It is not said, and he does not say clearly, that any religion is natural. Hoever, he does talk / imply that Islam has no place for the supernatural mysteries. But then the mysteries regard the content of faith, perhaps? That position, in that case, would not really exclude the possibility of a truly supernatural gift of God’s love given even in Islam.

Nature-grace and natural-supernatural

Sean Doyle, in Synthesizing the Vedanta: The Theology of Pierre Johanns, S.J. (2006) speaks interchangeably of the nature-grace distinction and the natural-supernatural distinction.

This needs to be explored, but I think the two are not coincident. Grace may be operative in both natural and supernatural religions, for example. The natural-supernatural distinction is based on proportion: truths that are proportionate to human nature are called natural truths; truths that are beyond the proportion of human nature are called supernatural truths. This distinction was drawn by Thomas. And Thomas admitted clearly the possibility of God revealing not only supernatural but also natural truths.

Vatican II clearly admits the possibility of grace operative in non-Christian religions and even among atheists. But that hardly does away with the natural-supernatural distinction.

Still, a certain amount of confusion followed after Vatican II. Having accepted the operation of grace beyond the boundaries of the Church, theologians did away also with the natural-supernatural distinction. I am not sure that this follows. And I am not sure whether maintaining such a distinction is politically incorrect. 

Radical Orthodoxy on faith and reason

I was trying to find out how Radical Orthodoxy understands the relationship of faith and reason in Aquinas. They certainly do not deny that Aquinas has this distinction. However, they say that it is far more porous than usually thought.

So: in what way more porous? I quote my summary:

Milbank hopes to show that the distinguished approaches “can at the very most be thought of only as distinct phases within a single gnoseological extension exhibiting the same qualities throughout. Then we will further establish that even the phases are not clearly bounded in terms of what can or cannot be achieved.... Having established these points concerning Aquinas’s method, we shall then show how his ‘rational’ treatment of Creation is informed by faith, while his exposition of the revealed Trinity is in fact highly demonstrative. [So what’s new about this?] Throughout we hope to show how a ‘radically orthodox’ position (primarily characterized by a more persistent refusal of distinct ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ phases and a consequent assault upon an autonomous naturalism as ‘nihilistic’), can indeed be rendered as an attentive reading of Aquinas.” [21.]

So the rejection of the natural-supernatural distinction – see de Lubac – is fundamental to RO. Wonderful. Something to be chewed upon! See Guy Mansini, who calls this the fundamental theological point – a watershed – in the 20^th century. See also Michael Stebbins’ excellent reading of Lonergan on this point in his The Divine Initiative. See my notes on this topic somewhere – perhaps on this blog. I have also downloaded an article by Raymond Moloney, “De Lubac and Lonergan on the Supernatural.” But Stebbins is far superior on the point.

My feeling: what RO is trying to say might not be that different - or radically new - when compared to someone like Lonergan. In fact, my feeling is that Lonergan will be far superior on the proper understanding of the natural-supernatural distinction. From my cursory reading of Stebbins, I have the impression that Lonergan even corrects de Lubac, and certainly brings a far more sophisticated reading to the distinction. 

Whatever: I must admit that Mansini - despite his snide remarks on Lonergan - seems right on when he identifies the distinction as a watershed in 20th century philosophy. 

De Lubac and Lonergan

Raymond Moloney, "De Lubac and Lonergan on the Supernatural," Theological Studies (Sep. 2008). FindArticles.com. 17 Jul, 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6404/is_3_69/ai_n29459020/

A sympathetic article. Moloney is director of the Lonergan Centre, Dublin. Proposes that Lonergan refines certain issues in de Lubac.

Henri de Lubac

Just discovering the connection between de Lubac, Danielou and von Balthasar: the latter two were de Lubac's students.

Guy Mansini also acknowledges the de Lubac - von Balthasar link. If this is true, it means that de Lubac is (no longer) ultra but con. The web says that John XXIII invited him as peritus to the council, and that Paul VI and John Paul II both esteemed him deeply. This, despite the fact that he was banned from publishing (for about 9 years) after his Surnaturel.

One of the reasons for the furore around his work was also that he attacked Suarez - till then regarded as one of the bulwarks of Thomism. He showed how Suarez had commented on what are now known to be spurious works, falsely attributed to Thomas.

De Lubac co-founded Concilium, but broke with it when it became a journal of dissent rather than implementation of the council. He joined von Balthasar and Ratzinger in founding Communio, believing that the only way to renew theology was ressourcement or critical appropriation of the Church's tradition.

Back to the supernatural: I do not know what exactly de Lubac has said, and I know only very vaguely what Lonergan holds on the matter. But I do have the feeling that there is something to be chewed at here, and that Lonergan might have something very interesting to contribute... But: could it be that great minds have missed this all along? Can't presume... And: is there any study of the matter in Lonergan?

And: does Millbank fuse together what Thomas had so carefully distinguished (not separated) - the gratuity of creation and the gratuity of grace? (See http://www.leithart.com/archives/001960.php).

Interestingly, however, Millbank's reflections on the human being / human existence itself as gift seem to veer on Lonergan's reflections on operative grace / gift of God's love as creating the response (our love for God), or as itself being the response. But on this, see my blog entry on Charles Hefling. More to be studied here.

Another note: de Lubac was enormously interested in Maritain's work. Does Maritain take his natural / supernatural distinctions from de Lubac? What then of the religions?

De Lubac's properly theological influence consists in the re-Platonizing of theology, a re-Platonizing that has been developed and continued in the postmodern drive to avoid the strictures of Heidegger against onto-theology. (Mansini 597. References to: J. Komonchak, "Theology and Culture at Mid-Century: The Example of Henri de Lubac," ThStds 91 (1990) 579-602. Wayne Hankey, "Le role du neoplatonisme dans les tentatives postmodernes d'echapper a l'onto-theologie," La metaphysique: son histoire, sa critique, ses jeux, Actes du XXVIIe Congres de l'Association de Societes de Philosophie de Langue Francaise, 2 vols. (Quebec: Les Presses de L'Universite Laval, 2000); and "Neoplatonism and Contemporary French Philosophy," Dionysius 23 (2005) 161-189. Both articles to be found on Hankey's website.)

Mansini on de Lubac

There seems to be a sudden spurt of studies on Henri de Lubac. Just yesterday I found the following:

Reinhard Hütter. “The Natural Desire for the Vision of God: A Relecture of Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 25, après Henri de Lubac.” The Thomist 73/4 (2009) 523-591.

Guy Mansini. “The Abiding Theological Significance of Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel.” The Thomist 73/4 (2009) 593-619.

Mansini calls de Lubac the most important theologian of the 20th century, because his work forms a watershed. (593)

He says that Lonergan with his Method in Theology aspires to be pivotal, but that one can easily be a Catholic theologian today without having to take a position on Lonergan. One cannot do that as far as de Lubac is concerned. (596, n. 7) Mansini, I think, is right; but only because Lonergan in Method is not doing theology, he is outlining a method for theology - and for all other disciplines.

It is interesting, however, to see how Lonergan emerges as a foil every so often in Mansini's article. Thus, for example, he outlines the theological territory after Vatican II into (1) those who agree with Chenu and the later Rahner on dogma, and also with de Lubac on the correctness of his theological anthropology and reading of St Thomas; (2) those who do not agree with Chenu on dogma but agree with de Lubac - Balthasar and the 'Communio' theologians; (3) those who agree with neither, and then comments in the footnote: the tragedy of Lonergan is that he tries to provide an inoculation against the historicism and relativism to which the first position (Chenu, Rahner, de Lubac) are prone, and at the same time save the scientific character of theology, which the second group has abandoned. (598 and n. 11)

Most interesting, Mansini notes Lonergan's 'theorem of the supernatural', and says that he has not found de Lubac referring to Philip the Chancellor in Surnaturel or in Augustinianism and Modern Theology, or in Mystery of the Supernatural. (612 n. 36)

But what exactly is de Lubac saying in his Surnaturel? According to Mansini, he does away with the need for the notion of pure nature as something that is not Thomist but Thomistic.

I simply have to get to the bottom of this.

The theorem of the supernatural

One of the things I need to get clear about in Lonergan is what he calls the theorem of the supernatural. The other day, during Nelson's homily, I thought I got a little window onto this theorem. Nelson was quoting St Paul: "What is it that we have not received?" It reminded me of Lonergan speaking about the problem faced by early Christian reflection on grace: how to distinguish grace from the fact that everything is received, everything is gift? The answer is probably a difference in proportion: nature and supernature, what is proportionate to human nature and what is not proportionate to it, what is simply beyond it. A distinction, therefore, between two orders. Not that there is or was a state of pure nature; but that we need this kind of distinction if we are to handle reflection on the Christian revelation.