The natural and the supernatural in the religions

Joaquim’s paper Jacques Maritain e la mistica natural Indiana,” a reworked version of the article we printed in DJPE, makes very clear the position of Maritain: Christian mysticism is supernatural; Indian mysticism is really an experience of the self, and purely natural. However, he does admit that there could be ‘mixtures’ – mystical experiences that have ‘touches’ of the supernatural. How, I have to read further to understand.
I was asking myself: how does this position compare with that of Lonergan? Perhaps this way. In his earlier writings, Lonergan would talk of natural, relatively supernatural and absolutely supernatural solutions to the problem of evil. In his later position, he would take the clear (Christian) stand that the actually realized dispensation is absolutely supernatural. He would go further and state that the absolutely supernatural gift of God’s love is given to all, and therefore is available / given in all religions. He would say clearly that, in their positive moments, all religions are fruits of the gift of the Spirit.
I am thinking now that even in his earlier position, on the hypothesis / faith assertion that the actually realized dispensation is the absolutely supernatural one, he might have envisaged such a position. It is not said, and he does not say clearly, that any religion is natural. Hoever, he does talk / imply that Islam has no place for the supernatural mysteries. But then the mysteries regard the content of faith, perhaps? That position, in that case, would not really exclude the possibility of a truly supernatural gift of God’s love given even in Islam.

Maritain and Indian Philosophy

I had known from Joaquim D'Souza that Maritain had taken a great interest in Indian philosophy, to the extent of encouraging Oliver Lacombe to specialize in Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy and come out with great books such as L'Absolu selon le Vedanta.

But I learnt something more yesterday: that Maritain had himself translated Georges Dandoy's An Essay in the Doctrine of the Unreality of the World in the Advaita (Calcutta, 1919). See L'ontologie du Vedanta, tr. J. Maritain (Paris, 1932).

Ambedkar and Maritain

From Augustine Arulraj I learn that Ambedkar draws - at least a bit - on Jacques Maritain. Augustine has managed to supply one quotation from Ambedkar's works; the extent of the influence remains to be seen.

Also, it may be interesting to see which side Maritain, a Thomist philosopher opts for: the hierarchical, organic society or the atomistic, equalitarian society. As a Thomist, he should probably opt for the former. But as a major thinker about democracy, I wonder.

Going back to Ambedkar, Augustine tells me, of course, that, even if Ambedkar began with Dewey and Maritain, he ends with the Buddhist concept of human being. Of course, the pragmatism of Dewey probably vibes well with the pragmatism of the Buddha.

Note of 5 Jan 2010: It looks like this is a false alarm. Ambedkar does quote Maritain, but just once, in Vol. 3 of his collected writings, p. 90. The quote is from Maritain's essay, "The Concept of Human Person."

Note of 25 Jan 2010: Ambedkar took his quotation from Maritain from Freedom: Its Meaning by Ruth Nanda Kishen. There is probably no such person as Ruth Nanda Kishen, but there is an American Philosopher called Ruth Nanda Anshen, and here are some details from the latter: J. Maritain, "The Conquest of Freedom," in Freedom: Its Meaning, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1940; London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1942)631-49, as cited in B. Ambedkar, Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, ed. Vasant Moon (Bombay: Education Department, Govt. of Maharashtra, 1987) 3:95. Maritain's article is also available in The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain: Selected Readings, ed. Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (??: ??, 1955) ??; this is a translation from the revised and corrected text published in J. Maritain, Principes d'une politique humaniste (New York: ??, 1944) 13-42.

There does not seem to be any essay called "The Concept of Human Person" in the Anshen collection. See Books in the Jacques Maritain Center at Notre Dame. Books with Chapters / Sections by the Maritains, at http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/chapters.htm as of 25 Jan 2010.

Lonergan and Knasas again

From Joaquim D'Souza again, on Lonergan and Knasas, on 4 September 2009:

In the little piece you sent me about my profile, I’m somewhat embarrassed to be called a specialist in Medieval Philosophy or an enthusiast of Maritain. I’m, I believe, just a simple student of Thomas Aquinas, trying to understand him with the help of Gilson as regards his historical interpretation, and with the help of Maritain as regards the creative development and application of Aquinas’ thought for our times. Both Gilson and Maritain were great Thomists, who tried to make the fundamental intuitions and principles of Thomas intelligible and relevant to our times. I don’t see Thomism as having only a historical value, but as being very relevant today. Gilson and Maritain converge on many points, and they influenced each other’s work. Where they differ (i.e. on the intuition of being or on critical realism), I am inclined to follow Maritain.

Both opposed the Transcendental Method of Marechal and held fast to immediate realism as being unequivocally the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. I too subscribe to immediate realism, for I fail to understand how anyone starting from the data of consciousness as immediately evident can through the dynamism of the intellect with its unrestricted quest for the Absolute ever arrive at the real existing apart from the conscious subject. If the data of consciousness is what I start with, the terminal point of the intellectual striving will still be a data of consciousness. In other words, the question of the real existing apart from the conscious subject would not even arise, as all I have from start to finish is data of consciousness. Unless, of course, I hold as evident from the start that the data of consciousness is the real obtained from sense knowledge. The data of consciousness therefore is not indifferent or neutral with regard to real existence, subsequently to be validated as real in the process of striving towards the Absolute, but from the start has the valency of real immediately evident in it perceived in sense knowledge. Otherwise, as Gilson says, one who begins with Descartes inevitably ends up with Hegel – a confirmed idealist.

Unfortunately, in my formative years I was not introduced to Lonergan. On my own, I read his Cognitional Structure and his The Subject, and some initial chapters of Insight, but no more than that. So I would be interested to know how he would respond to Knasas’ critique of the Transcendental Method in general, and of Lonergan’s position in particular.

Well, that’s about where I stand in my philosophical affiliations.

Knasas' critique of Lonergan

From Joaquim D'Souza, on 31 August 2009:

I had mentioned to you in Nashik about a critique of Lonergan re.
objectivity by John F.X. Knasas in his "Being and Some Twentieth Century Philosophers" (available in the Divyadaan Library). There is a response to the critique by Jeremy D. Williams in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (ACPQ 78 (2004) 107-130), followed by a rejoinder by Knasas (ACPQ 78 (2004) 131-150). Knasas also criticises Maritain in the book, Being and Some..., for surreptitiously introducing into Critical Realism of the straightforward type the technique of retorsion of the Transcendental Method. I'll need to look closely into that, but I'd be interested to have your opinion on the critique of Lonergan by Knasas, if you have the time. It could make a nice article for the Divyadaan Journal.