Inner word as product of the insight

I suddenly am unclear about "insight," "inner word," "outer word."

Outer word = the external expression of an insight / inner word. 

Insight: intelligere / the act of understanding.

Inner word: the generalization of insight into a particular; more than a understanding of a particular; scientific generalization is involvled. 

How is this different from the outer word?

I checked UB and also 1C: the index does not show anything on inner word.

VB has lots on inner word; but see the Index under "self-expression". 

Heidegger and the inner word

Sean J. McGrath. "Heidegger and Duns Scotus on truth and language." The Review of Metaphysics (Dec. 2003). See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3545/is_2_57/ai_n29056570/pg_5/?tag=content;col1

Arthos' The Inner Word in Gadamer's Hermeneutics

Just received for review John Arthos' The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009). Wonderfully brought out, a pleasure to see and feel. As Pradeep Sebastian says: "The book is a physical object. And I see it as a work of art, where binding, typography, edition matter." (The Groaning Shelf, Hachete, cited in Suresh Menon, "A Modest Miracle: The Groaning Shelf is a stylish, cultural landmark communicating one man's passion to a larger audience," The Hindu, Sunday, 3 October 2010, p. 2.)

To his credit, Arthos notes that De natura verbi intellectus is possibly spurious, even though Gadamer regarded it as a genuine work of Aquinas. 

Again, interestingly Lonergan’s Verbum and The Way to Nicea are cited in the Bibliography, though not in the (very short) Index. Fred Lawrence is not, however. 

Pickstock is mentioned in the book (p. ??), though neither in the Bibliography nor in the Index. 

Bhartrhari's Sabda-brahman and inner word

De Smet has a one page outline of Bhartrhari's Sadbadvaita, which I found fascinating. And then he ends with this even more rewarding remark:

N.B. Fascinating parallels could be made between this doctrine and the rich and varied conceptions of the internal word among Christians, especially St Augustine and the medieval Schoolmen. (Guidelines 226)

De Smet never ceases to amaze me: he knew about Augustine's doctrine of the inner word, and surely Thomas' reworking of it. But this is the first mention I have come across in the De Smet corpus.

It [the Sabda-brahman] is not to be attained through a special experience of the mystical order beyond all empirical phenomena (as the Sabda-brahman of Mandana Misra) but as the internal Word at the point of consciousness wherefrom all empirical knowledge radiates. This is why this is a philosophy for the man-in-the-world.

The Sabda-brahman is the ontological-linguistic Fullness wherefrom emanate in reciprocal harmony (a) the consciousnesses, (b) the objects with their visible or invisible potencies, (c) the Vedic word which relates these two realms. It is the Spiritual Energy (cit-sakti) of the universe.

Bhartrhari on meaning and utterance

From Bhartrhari, Vakyapadiya, I, 45-49, cited in De Smet, Guidelines, p. 214:

Some of those who follow the ancient path say that sphota and nada are different in nature. Others say that we divide by thought what is really one into two. Just as the flame of the firestick is the cause of other flames being produced, so the sphota in the buddhi is the cause of the variety of sounds we hear (nada). It is first thought out by the mind, then associated with some object, and then grasped as sabda. Nada is produced in succession; but sphota has no before or after. Although not successively produced, it appears as if gradually made and thus appears divided. Just as a reflection [of the sun, for instance,] seems to take on the motion of the water in which it exists because it is subject to that motion, so also is the relation of sphota and nada.

This text has echoes of Augustine on the inner word; or at least, it hovers around the same area. Nada is the utterance - also known by others as dhvani; it bears all the marks of manifold particularity (difference of pitch, accent, etc.). Sphota - also known by others as artha or meaning - is the sense-giving internal cause of nada.

We see Bhartrhari struggling with the relationship between sphota and nada: some say they are different; others say they are one. [But the problem is not really the relationship between meaning and utterance; the problem is the relationship between intelligere and dicere, the moment of the insight and the emergence of the inner word.]

Sphota is "first thought out by the mind", "then associated with some object", and "then grasped as sabda." First thought out by the mind is fine; what is "then associated with some object"? Is it the moment of identification / objectification? Or does B hold here for some simple application of the eternal sphota to some concrete individual? And what is "then grasped as sabda"? What is sabda here?

"Nada is produced in succession; but sphota has no before or after." Very much like Augustine describing the inner word as beyond any particular language, etc.

At any rate: B holds clearly for a distinction between sphota and nada.

The problem is that he has a theory of eternal sphotas, rather than sphotas / meanings that are actively grasped in data.